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Abstract
We define social institutions as strategies in some repeated game.
With this interpretation in mind, we consider the impact of intro-
ducing requirements on strategies which have been viewed as neces-
sary properties for any social institution to endure. The properties
we study are finite complexity, symmetry, global stability, and semi-
perfection. We show that: (1) If a strategy satisfies these proper-
ties then players play a Nash equilibrium of the stage game in every
period; (2) The set of finitely complex, symmetric, globally stable,
semi-perfect equilibrium payoffs in the repeated game equals the set
of Nash equilibria payoffs in the stage game; and (3) A strategy vector
satisfies these properties in a Pareto optimal way if and only if players
play some Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium of the stage game in ev-
ery stage. These results provide a social institution interpretation of
Nash equilibrium: individual behavior in enduring social institutions
is described by Nash equilibria.
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1 Introduction
The concept of Nash equilibrium is one of the central concepts in economic
analysis. Notwithstanding, many authors have proposed alternative notions
of equilibria by arguing that in certain circumstances some Nash equilibria
may be implausible.1 These refinements inevitably lead to the question:
When is it appropriate to apply the concept of Nash equilibrium?
In his Ph.D. dissertation, John Nash proposed two interpretations of his
equilibrium concept, with the objective of showing how equilibrium points
“(...) can be connected with observable phenomenon.” (Nash (1950, p. 21))
One interpretation is rationalistic: if we assume that players are rational,
they know the full structure of the game, the game is played just once, and
there is just one Nash equilibrium, then players will play according to that
equilibrium.2
A second interpretation, which Nash names mass-action interpretation,
is less demanding on the players. In this interpretation, “[i]t is unnecessary
to assume that the participants have full knowledge of the total structure of
the game, or the ability and inclination to go through any complex reasoning
processes.” (Nash (1950, p. 21)) What is assumed is that there is a pop-
ulation of participants for each position in the game, which will be played
throughout time by participants drawn at random from the different popu-
lations. If there is a stable average frequency with which each pure strategy
is employed by the “average member” of the appropriate population, then
this stable average frequency constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
The framework developed by Nash (1950) for the mass-action interpre-
tation is also appealing as a description of individuals’ interaction in large
societies. In particular, Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995), and Kan-
dori (1992) have used a similar framework to stress the importance of social
institutions in individual decision-making: In environments in which indi-
viduals interact throughout time, and have limited information about the
others, social institutions can be helpful to summarize the past, and form
expectations about the behavior of other players. Will social institutions
typically recommend players to play Nash equilibria? The main objective
of this paper is to argue that in those social institutions that are likely to
endure, players play a Nash equilibrium in every period, and hence provide
1See van Damme (1991) for a summary of the literature on refinements of Nash equi-
libria.
2For a formal discussion of these ideas, see Aumann and Brandenburger (1995).
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a social institution interpretation of Nash equilibrium.
In this paper, we define social institutions as strategies in some repeated
game.3 Although there may not be a complete agreement on the notion of
social institutions, several authors have described them in this fashion. For
example, Schotter (1981, p. 24) argues that “(...) social institutions can
be best described as noncooperative equilibria of supergames that involve
repeated play of some particular constituent game (...).”
The case for interpreting social institutions as strategies can be further
strengthened by the fact that each strategy in any repeated game can be
represented as an automaton (see Kalai and Stanford (1988, Lemma 3.1, p.
401).) An automaton is described by a set of states (one of which is spec-
ified to be the initial state), by a transition function (which gives the next
round’s state as a function of the current round’s state and actions), and by
a behavior function (which prescribes behavior according to the state of the
automaton). If we interpret the states of the automaton as “social roles,”
then an automaton (i.e., a strategy) prescribes players’ behavior according to
their social role, which is in turn determined by their past actions. This in-
terpretation corresponds closely, for example, to Roberts and Holdren (1972,
p. 110)’s definition of a social institution:
“An institution will be defined as a system of rules applicable
to established practices (or situations) and generally accepted by
the members of a social system. (...) The essential point is that
an institution specifies consequences of individual or group action
which can be expected. Given an existing institution, an individ-
ual or a group knows to some extent the reaction its activities
will evoke.”
Also, it corresponds closely to Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995, p.
80)’s definition of a social norm:
“A norm for a society will provide what we call a “social
standard of behavior” that will prescribe to a player in a conflict
situation with another player a particular action that depends
on his characteristics and those of his opponent. We will use the
term status to describe an individual’s relevant characteristics. A
social standard of behavior will thus prescribe an agent’s action
as a function of his and his opponent’s status.”
3For more on the notion of social institutions, see Carmona (2002c).
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Viewing social institutions as supergame strategies, several authors have
argued that equilibria in such games should satisfy certain additional prop-
erties. These additional properties should be imposed not only because they
are regarded as desirable from a normative point of view, but also, because
they are viewed as properties that social institutions typically have, and
which may be necessary for any social institution to endure. Typically, those
properties fall in one of the following categories:
1. simplicity,
2. symmetry,
3. stability,
4. complexity.
Aumann (1981, p. 21) proposed the use of finite automata in order to
define a simple class of repeated game strategies.4 That social institutions
should be simple, and represented by finite automata was defended, or at
least assumed, by Kandori (1992, p. 72), Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite
(1995, p. 83), Rubinstein (1986, p. 84), and Schotter (1981, p. 57).
Symmetry is a property that is often assumed to capture the notion of a
common culture or a common legal system. We will call a strategy symmetric
if all players share a common state space, and a common transition function,
properties which were assumed in Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995)’s
social norms.
One stability property that has been advocated is that mistakes that
players might make in the beginning of the game shouldn’t have a long-
term effect in players’ payoffs — this property was named global stability by
Kandori (1992, p. 73). Some other stability properties that are close in spirit
to global stability were proposed by Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995,
p. 100).
It has been argued earlier that players should use strategies that can be
represented by finite automata. Hence, in this case, it is natural to define the
complexity of a strategy by the size (i.e., the number of states) of the small-
est automata that implements it (see Kalai and Stanford (1988, Theorem
4Finite automata were introduced by McCulloch and Pitts (1943); see also Hopcroft
and Ullman (1979).
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3.1, p. 401).)5 Regarding complexity considerations, it has been advocated
that players’ preferences should be assumed to depend both on repeated
game payoffs and the complexity of the strategies they use. One equilibrium
concept defined in terms of such preferences is Rubinstein (1986, p. 90)’s
semi-perfection.
We study the structure of finitely complex, symmetric, globally stable,
semi-perfect equilibria. Our main results are:
1. A strategy vector is a finitely complex, symmetric, globally stable, semi-
perfect equilibrium only if players play a Nash equilibrium of the stage
game in every period.
2. The set of finitely complex, symmetric, globally stable, semi-perfect
equilibrium payoffs in the repeated game equals the set of Nash equi-
libria payoffs in the stage game, and
3. A strategy vector is a Pareto optimal, globally stable, symmetric, finitely
complex, semi-perfect equilibrium if and only if players play some
Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium of the stage game in every stage.
These results provide a social institution interpretation of Nash equilib-
rium: In a given society, simple, symmetric, stable and minimally complex
behavior associated with social institutions is described by Nash equilibria.
2 Notation and Definitions
Our notation follows closely the one used by Kalai and Stanford (1988). A
normal form game G is defined by
G =
(
N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N
)
, (1)
where: (1) N is the set of players, (2) Ai is a the set of player i’s actions,
and (3) for all i ∈ N , ui : A → R, where A =
∏
i∈N Ai, is player i’s payoff
function. We assume that N is a finite set, and that N = {1, . . . , n}. The
set Ai, i ∈ N , may or may not be finite.
5Alternative definitions of the complexity of a strategy are proposed in Banks and
Sundaram (1990), and in Lipman and Srivastava (1990).
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The supergame of G consists of an infinite sequence of repetitions of G
taking place in periods t = 1, 2, 3, . . . . At period t the players make simulta-
neous moves denoted by ati ∈ Ai and then each player learns his opponent’s
move.
Finally we need to specify the strategies players can use and also a way
to evaluate payoff in the supergame of G. For k ≥ 1, a k−stage history is
a k−length sequence hk = (a1, . . . , ak), where, for all 1 ≤ t ≤ k, at ∈ A;
the space of all k−stage histories is Hk, i.e., Hk = Ak (the k−fold Cartesian
product of A.) The notation e stands for the unique 0–stage history — it is
a 0–length history that represents the beginning of the supergame. The set
of all histories is defined by H =
⋃∞
n=0Hn.
For every h ∈ H, define hr ∈ A to be the projection of h onto its rth
coordinate. For every h ∈ H we let `(h) denote the length of h. For two
positive length histories h and h¯ in H we define the concatenation of h and
h¯, in that order, to be the history (h · h¯) of length `(h) + `(h¯): (h · h¯) =
(h1, h2, . . . , h`(h), h¯1, h¯2, . . . , h¯`(h¯)). We also make the convention that e · h =
h · e = h for every h ∈ H.
It is assumed that at stage k each player knows hk, that is, each player
knows the actions that were played in all previous stages. As for strategies,
players choose behavioral strategies. That is, in each stage k, they choose
a function from Hk−1 to Ai denoted f ik, for player i ∈ N . The set of player
i’s strategies is denoted by Σi, and Σ =
∏
i∈N Σi is the joint strategy space.
Finally, a strategy vector is f =
({f ik}∞k=1)i∈N .
Any strategy f ∈ F induces an history h(f) as follows:
h1(f) = f(e), hk(f) = f(h1(f), . . . , hk−1(f)), (2)
for k ∈ N.
The payoff in the supergame of G is, for δ ∈ (0, 1), the discounted sum
of stage game payoffs:
U i(f) = (1− δ)
∞∑
k=1
δk−1ui(hk(f)). (3)
Given an individual strategy fi ∈ Σi and a history h ∈ H we denote
the individual strategy induced by fi at h by fi|h. This strategy is defined
pointwise on H: (fi|h)(h¯) = fi(h · h¯), for every h¯ ∈ H. We will use (f |h) to
denote (f1|h, . . . , fn|h) for every f ∈ S and h ∈ H. We let Σi(fi) = {fi|h :
h ∈ H} and Σ(f) = {f |h : h ∈ H}.
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2.1 Automata and Symmetry
For i ∈ N, let fi be a strategy for player i. We define an equivalence relation
on H, by declaring the histories h and h¯ equivalent relative to fi, h ∼fi h¯,
if for every history β ∈ H, fi(h · β) = fi(h¯ · β). In words, the behavior
prescribed by fi after h is the same as the behavior prescribed by fi after
h¯. Let H/ ∼fi denote the quotient set of H relative to ∼fi . Then the
complexity of fi, denoted by comp(fi), is defined to be the cardinality of
H/ ∼fi(see Kalai (1990, Theorem 4.2, p. 144).) Let Fi denote the set of
player i’s strategies with finite complexity, and let F =
∏
i∈N Fi. Also, let
[h]fi denote the equivalence class of h ∈ H; when its clear which equivalence
relation we are refereing to, we write [h] for [h]fi .
An automaton for player i is a triple Ii = ((Si, s
0
i ), Ti, Bi) where: Si is a
set of states ; s0i is an initial state; Ti : Si × A → Si is a transition function;
and Bi : Si → Ai is a behavior function. Any automaton Ii for player i
induces a strategy fIi as follows: for an history h ∈ H with `(h) = m define
inductively
s0i (h) = s
0
i , s
r
i (h) = Ti(s
r−1
i (h), h
r) for r = 1, 2, . . . ,m, (4)
and then fIi(h) = Bi(s
m(h)).
Given a strategy fi ∈ Fi for player i, we say that the automaton Ii
implements fi if fi = fIi . For fi ∈ Fi we see that Ifi defined by Sfi = H/ ∼fi ,
s0fi = [e], Tfi([h], a) = [h · a] and Bfi([h]) = fi(h), implements fi. Moreover,
Ifi is minimal in the sense that if Ii also implements fi then the cardinality
of Sfi is less than or equal to the cardinality of Si (see Kalai (1990, Theorem
4.2, p. 144), and also Kalai and Stanford (1988, Theorem 3.1, p. 401).)
Given this result, we will regard any strategy as an automaton.
The following notation will be useful: Given a strategy f ∈ Σ and a state
s ∈ S = ∏i∈N Si we denote the strategy induced by f at s by f |s. The
strategy f |s is just like f , except perhaps on the initial state: for any i ∈ N ,
if fi = ((Si, s
0
i ), Ti, Bi), then fi|s = ((Si, si), Ti, Bi).
We will say that a strategy is symmetric if players condition their play on
a common state variable, and this common state variable evolves according
to a common transition function.
Definition 1 A strategy vector f is symmetric if for all i, j ∈ N , Si = Sj,
s0i = s
0
j , and Ti = Tj.
We interpret symmetry as a common culture, or a common legal system.
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2.2 Stability
In this section, we give the stability definition for repeated game strategies
that we will use.
Definition 2 (Kandori (1992)) Let f ∈ Σ and let (u¯i)i∈N = (U i(f))i∈N .
Then f is globally stable if for all i ∈ N , and s ∈ S,
lim
k→∞
U ik(f |s) = u¯i, (5)
where U ik(f |s) = (1− δ)
∑∞
t=k δ
t−kui((f |s)t) is player i’s continuation payoff
at stage k.
Note that in the definition of global stability the state s is any possible
state, not necessarily the one implied by the play of the equilibrium strategy.
The requirement of global stability is that no matter what the past has been,
future play of the equilibrium strategies will asymptotically give players the
same payoff as if the equilibrium strategies were always followed. Kandori
introduced this concept in the context of his work on social norms to cap-
ture the intuition that social norms are generally “robust to the mistakes of
players” and that they allow “players to test various actions in order to learn
[them]”.
2.3 Complexity
As Rubinstein (1998, p. 137) writes, “[a]t the heart of our discussion in
this [section] is the trade-off often facing a decision maker when choosing a
strategy. On one hand, he hopes his strategy will serve his goals; on the other
hand, he would like it to be as simple as possible. There are many reasons
why a player may value simplicity: a more complex plan of action is more
likely to break down, is more difficult to learn and may require more time to
be implemented. We will not examine these reasons here but simply assume
that complexity is costly and under the control of the player.”
We assume as in Abreu and Rubinstein (1988, p. 1264) that players’
preferences depend both on repeated game payoffs and the complexity of the
strategies they use. For any player i ∈ N , let ºi be player i’s preference
relation on R× N. We assume that ºi
1. is increasing in the payoff:
a > b and α = β implies (a, α) Âi (b, β). (6)
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2. is decreasing in complexity:
a = b and α > β implies (a, α) ≺i (b, β). (7)
An equilibrium concept defined using the above preference relation is:
Definition 3 (Rubinstein (1986)) A strategy vector f ∈ F is a semi-
perfect equilibrium if for all i ∈ N , s ∈ S1 × · · · × Sn and gi ∈ Fi,
(U i(f |s), comp(fi)) ºi (U i((gi, f−i)|(sg0i , s−i)), comp(gi)). (8)
A particular case, considered in Rubinstein (1986), arises when players
have lexicographic preferences over payoffs and complexity. This preference
relation, denoted by ºL is defined as follows: for (a, α), (b, β) in R × N,
(a, α) ÂL (b, β) if and only if a > b or a = b and α > β. It is then clear that
if players have lexicographic preference, then any semi-perfect equilibrium is
a subgame prefect equilibrium. This result is not true for general preferences
in games with more than two players. However, for two player games with
preferences satisfying properties 1 and 2 above, it is true that any semi-perfect
equilibrium is a subgame prefect equilibrium (see Piccione (1992, Theorem
2, p. 187)).
3 Structure of Equilibria
In this section, we state and prove our main results, concerning the structure
of equilibria. They provide a characterization of the (finitely complex, sym-
metric, globally stable, semi-perfect) equilibrium payoffs, and of the Pareto
optimal equilibria. Also, they provide necessary conditions on the form of
equilibrium strategies.
Our first result shows that all states will be used in equilibrium, and
that any state can be reached starting from any other state. Note that
any symmetric, finitely complex strategy f induces a Markov Chain on the
common state space S = S1 = · · · = Sn. If Π denotes its transition matrix,
it follows that piss¯ equals either 1 or 0, for all s, s¯ ∈ S — that is, f induces a
deterministic Markov Chain on S. Formally, the Markov chain is determined
by the following relation:
piss¯ = 1 if and only if T (s, f(s)) = s¯. (9)
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Lemma 1 Let f ∈ F be a finitely complex, symmetric, semi-perfect equilib-
rium, and Π be the transition matrix of the Markov chain induced on S by
f . Then, Π is irreducible.
Proof. We will show that all states s ∈ S communicate, that is, for all s
and s¯ ∈ S, there is k ∈ N such that pi(k)ss¯ > 0.
Note that it is enough to show that for all s and s¯ ∈ S such that s 6= s¯,
there is k ∈ N such that pi(k)ss¯ > 0. This follows because if k is such that
pi
(k)
ss¯ > 0 and k¯ is such that pi
(k¯)
s¯s > 0, then pi
(k+k¯)
ss ≥ pi(k)ss¯ pi(k¯)s¯s > 0.
Let s and s¯ ∈ S, s 6= s¯, and suppose that for all k ∈ N we have pi(k)ss¯ = 0.
Then any player would deviate from f at state s, since he could remove the
state s¯ and still obtain the same payoff.
More formally, define an automaton f˜1 as follows: S˜1 = S \ s¯, s01 = s,
T˜1(s˜, a) =
{
s if T (h˜, a) = s¯
T (h˜, a) otherwise
(10)
and B˜1(s˜) = Bi(s˜). Since pi
(k)
ss¯ = 0 for all k ∈ N, it follows that (f˜1, f−1|s)
gives the same payoff to player 1 as f |s but comp(f˜1) < comp(f1). Hence,
it follows that f is not a semi-perfect equilibrium, and the lemma follows by
contraposition.
Lemma 1 implies that we can order S, and thus write S = {s0, s1, . . . , sL},
with L = |S| − 1, in such a way that sk = T (sk−1, B(sk−1)), for all k =
1, . . . , L, and s0 = T (sL, B(sL)). In other words, the play of the game will
induce a cycle on the set of states starting from the first period.
Since the states that are used in the play of the game will cycle, so will the
continuation payoffs for any given player. However, global stability requires
that continuation payoffs converge, which is possible only if they are all equal.
This is the content of the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Let f ∈ F be a finitely complex, symmetric, globally stable, semi-
perfect equilibrium, and let (u¯i)i∈N = (U i(f))i∈N .
Then for all i ∈ N and h ∈ H,
U i(f |s) = u¯i. (11)
Furthermore, ui(B(s)) = u¯i.
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Proof. Let i ∈ N and s ∈ S. Since S = {s0, s1, . . . , sL}, with L = |S|−1,
then s = sn for some 0 ≤ n ≤ L. We have then, for all k ∈ N,
U ik(f |s) =

U i(f |sn) if k = 1, L+ 1, 2L+ 1, . . .
U i(f |sn+1 mod L) if k = 2, L+ 2, 2L+ 2, . . .
...
U i(f |sn+L mod L) if k = L, 2L, 3L, . . . .
(12)
Since by assumption lim
k→∞
U ik(f |s) = u¯i, it follows that U i(f |sl) = u¯i, for
all 0 ≤ l ≤ L. In particular, U i(f |s) = U i(f |sn) = u¯i.
Finally, since U i(f |s) = (1−δ)ui(B(s))+δu¯i it follows that ui(B(s)) = u¯i.
As a consequence, we have Theorem 1, which yields a necessary condition
on equilibrium strategies.
Theorem 1 If a strategy f = ((S, s0), T, B) is a finitely complex, symmetric,
globally stable, semi-perfect equilibrium then B(s) is a Nash equilibrium of
G, for all s ∈ S.
Proof. Let s ∈ S and i ∈ N . Then Bi(s) is a static best reply to B−i(s),
which establishes the theorem. The action Bi(s) is a static best reply to
B−i(s) is because otherwise player i would deviate and play using a strategy
that differs from fi only on the action played on state s.
More formally, assume that Bi(s) is not a best reply to B−i(s). Let a∗ be a
best reply in G against B−i(s). In particular, ui(a∗, B−i(s)) > ui(B(s)) = u¯i.
Define f˜i as follows: S˜i = S, s˜
0
i = s, T˜i = T and
B˜i(s˜) =
{
a∗ if s˜ = s
Bi(s˜) otherwise.
(13)
It follows immediately that comp(f˜i) = comp(fi). Also, letting L denote
the length of the cycle of (f˜i, f−i)|s, we obtain that Ui((f˜i, f−i)|s) > Ui(f |s),
since
Ui((f˜i, f−i)|s) =
(1− δ)ui(a∗, B−i(s)) + δUi((f˜i, f−i)|T (s, (a∗, B−i(s))) =
(1− δ)ui(a∗, B−i(s)) + δ (λui(a∗, B−i(s)) + (1− λ)u¯i) >
u¯i = Ui(f |s),
(14)
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where λ = (1−δ)δ
L−1
1−δL . However, the above inequality is a contradiction to f
being a semi-perfect equilibrium.
Theorem 1 and Lemma 2 place strong restriction on the outcomes and
payoffs that can arise in equilibrium. They imply that in every stage of
a game in which players play in the way described in Theorem 1 we will
observe a Nash equilibrium of the stage game. This result yields the following
interpretation of Nash equilibria: In a given society, simple, symmetric, stable
and minimally complex behavior is described by Nash equilibria.
LetN(G) be the set of Nash equilibria payoffs in the stage gameG, and let
E(G) be the set of finitely complex, symmetric, globally stable, semi-perfect
equilibria payoffs in the repeated game. As an immediate consequence of
Theorem 1, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 2 E(G) = N(G).
Theorem 2 reinforces the association expressed in Theorem 1 between
Nash equilibria of a given stage game, and the simple, symmetric, stable,
and minimally complex equilibria of its supergame: This association is exact
for the payoff players receive in equilibrium.
Note that the association between Nash equilibrium outcomes of a given
stage game, and the simple, symmetric, stable, and minimally complex equi-
librium outcomes of its supergame is not exact. In fact, we may have an
equilibrium outcome in the supergame consisting of oscillations between sev-
eral different (but payoff equivalent) Nash equilibria.
Consider the following example of a coordination game. Let n = 2 and
Ai = {αi, βi}, i = 1, 2. Preferences are lexicographic for both players. Let
payoffs be given by
1\2 α2 β2
α1 1, 1 0, 0
β1 0, 0 1, 1
Table 1: Payoff Function for Example 1
Consider the following strategy: S = {s0, s1}, T (s0, a) = s1, T (s1, a) = s0
for all a, and B(s0) = (α1, α2), B(s
1) = (β1, β2). This strategy is clearly
finitely complex, symmetric, globally stable, and semi-perfect.
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However, one may argued that the above equilibrium outcome is un-
likely: players would eventually agree to meet in just one location, because
they would reduce the complexity of their behavior, while maintaining their
payoff. In other words, that strategy is Pareto dominated by other strat-
egy satisfying all the properties we are interested with. In general, we say
a strategy σ in a given game is a Pareto optimal equilibrium if it is Pareto
optimal within the set of all equilibria (i.e., if it cannot be Pareto dominated
by any other equilibrium). This definition applies both to the game G and
to the supergame of G, and for any equilibrium concept we may want to use.
Our next result characterizes the set of Pareto optimal, finitely complex,
symmetric, globally stable, semi-perfect equilibria: They consist of repeti-
tions of a Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium of the stage game. In this way,
we obtain an exact association between Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium out-
comes of a given game, and the Pareto optimal finitely complex, symmetric,
globally stable, semi-perfect equilibrium outcomes of its supergame.
Theorem 3 A strategy f is a Pareto optimal, finitely complex, symmetric,
globally stable, semi-perfect equilibrium if and only if, comp(fi) = 1, for all
i ∈ N , and B(s) is a Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium of G, for all s ∈ S.
Proof. (Sufficiency) “Playing a Pareto optimal Nash equilibria of G al-
ways” constitutes a finitely complex, symmetric, globally stable, semi-perfect
equilibrium. Since N(G) = E(G), then this strategy is also Pareto optimal
equilibrium in the repeated game.
(Necessity) By Theorem 1 and Lemma 2, B(s) is a Nash equilibrium of
G and ui(B(s)) = u¯i. Therefore, comp(fi)=1, and B(s
0) is a Pareto optimal
equilibrium of G.
4 Discussion
We showed that in discounted repeated games strategies that are finitely
complex, symmetric, globally stable, and semi-perfect must prescribe a Nash
equilibria of the stage game in every period. Furthermore, a strategy is
also Pareto optimal if and only if it prescribes some Pareto optimal Nash
equilibrium of the stage game to be played in every period.
Our results provide an interpretation of Nash equilibrium points as the
outcomes one should expect in situations where the properties we have as-
sumed seem relevant. As we mentioned in the introduction, social institutions
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provide such an example: if players interactions are guided by social insti-
tutions satisfying all those properties, behavior will be described by Nash
equilibria. With this interpretation in mind, we can also use Theorem 3 to
describe the Pareto optimal social institution in societies that can be appro-
priately described by a discounted repeated game.
When applied to the repeated prisoners’ dilemma, the above results imply
that there is a unique finitely complex, symmetric, globally stable, semi-
perfect equilibrium. In this equilibrium players play ‘defect’ in every period,
and so any form of ‘cooperative behavior’ is impossible to obtain in a finitely
complex, symmetric, globally stable and semi-perfect way. This result may
provide a justification for the type of legal codes that we have, in which
deviators are punished by the State for a typically limited amount of time.
Given such a legal system, cooperation can be obtained in a way that the
behavior of all private individual (i.e., everyone except the State) satisfies
all the above properties: private individual need simply to play ‘cooperative’
in every period. A similar example is obtained by considering a group of
gangsters in which those that are not loyal to the group are punished by its
leader, or by someone in his close circle. In these examples, what is important
is the existence of some player that does not care about complexity, and can
therefore make credible the threat of punishments that will not be used in
equilibrium.
Our interpretation of Nash equilibrium points as outcomes that can arise
from repeated interaction of individuals through social institutions can pro-
vide an example in which the epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium in
normal form games established by Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) are
very natural. One of their conditions is that the conjecture players make
about the strategy of the others is commonly known.6 This assumptions
has been criticized by Jacobsen (1996) on the grounds that it is not plau-
sible to assume that one player knows what another player thinks. In our
framework, any conjecture a player might form about other players can be in-
terpreted as being part of the social institutions shaping players interaction.
This interpretation renders Aumann and Brandenburger (1995, Theorem B)’s
epistemic condition quite reasonable.
Theorem 1 states that the set of finitely complex, symmetric, globally
stable, semi-perfect equilibrium payoffs in the repeated game equals the set of
6See Aumann and Brandenburger (1995, Theorem B). If there are only two players,
then players conjectures need only to be mutually know, as their Theorem A shows.
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Nash equilibrium payoffs in the stage game. This result should be contrasted
with those obtained for the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs in the repeated
game: in particular, the Folk Theorem (see Aumann (1981), Fudenberg and
Maskin (1986), and Rubinstein (1979)) shows, under mild conditions, that
each individually rational payoff is a Nash equilibrium payoff, provided that
the discount factor is sufficiently close to one. Since a similar conclusion
does not hold for the set of finitely complex, symmetric, globally stable,
semi-perfect equilibrium payoffs, we can interpret Theorem 2 as an “anti-
Folk-Theorem” result. Surprisingly, this result is obtained with simple, and
reasonable conditions.
More important than the particular form of our results is the expression of
the following economic idea: static Nash equilibrium is a reasonable concept
to describe repeated strategic interactions guided by social institutions. It is
thus important to study to what extent does this general result depends on
the particular assumptions we made. In the appendix, we consider a weaker
version of stability, and different notions of minimal complexity.
The notion of weak global stability that we study requires only that the
continuation payoff after any state converges, and that the limit is inde-
pendent of the state we start with. We show (see Theorem 4, and 5) that
our results continue to hold when we replace global stability by weak global
stability.
We also consider the effect of weakening semi-perfection to Nash equi-
librium in the repeated game (but maintaining the requirement that players
care both about payoffs and about complexity). In this case we show by an
example that all of our results can fail. On the other hand, Theorem 5 shows
that if we strengthen the requirements of Nash equilibrium by considering
subgame perfect equilibrium (again maintaining the requirement that players
care both about payoffs and about complexity), then all our results hold if we
restrict attention to cycle states. Since we can interpret cycle states as long-
run behavior, we can still associate social institutions with Nash equilibrium:
if players use enduring social institutions, them their long-run behavior will
be described by Nash equilibria.
Another variation that can be made is on the definition of complexity of
a strategy. Banks and Sundaram (1990), in the same framework of ours but
with only two players, consider a measure of complexity that takes into ac-
count not only the number of states of the smallest automaton implementing
it, but also the number of transitions emanating from each state. They show,
by using this complexity measure, that assuming finite complexity is enough
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to obtain the conclusion of Theorem 1. However, analogues of Theorem 2,
and 3 are, in general, false.7
The idea that static Nash equilibria are reasonable descriptions of re-
peated strategic interactions is also present in the work of Green (1980),
Sabourian (1990), and Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky (2001). These authors
study repeated interactions in large societies, in which any player’s payoffs
depend on his choice, and an aggregate outcome. Under different assump-
tions, they show that in any subgame perfect equilibrium most players play
static ε−best replies in every period, i.e., an approximate version of our The-
orem 1 holds in their framework. Our results differ from these in two way:
first, although expressing similar ideas, the framework they consider differs
considerably from ours; and second, we obtain that, under the assumptions
of Theorem 1, exact Nash equilibria will be played.8
As pointed out by Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky (2001), we may interpret
our results as providing a justification of Markovian behavior. In our frame-
work there is no exogenous state variable, and so in any (time-independent)
Markovian strategy players play the same action profile in every period.
Thus, Theorem 3 justifies Markovian strategies as a Pareto optimal way of
obtaining finite complexity, symmetry, global stability, and semi-perfection.9
Markovian strategies are more appealing when there is an exogenous state
variable, i.e., in the stochastic case. Hence, it would be interesting to have an
analogue of Theorem 3 for stochastic games. If we allow the initial state of
any automata to be randomly determined, then the main result of Carmona
(2002a, chapter 4) shows that an analogue of Theorem 3 does not hold —
in general, non-Markovian strategies may be needed to obtain the above
properties in a Pareto optimal way. However, if the initial state of each
automaton is set deterministically (as is the case in the present paper), we
7As an example, consider the battle of the sexes game (see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991,
page 19)) in which only pure actions are allowed, and in which players have lexicographic
preferences in its supergame. Then, alternating between the two Nash equilibria of the
stage game is a Pareto optimal equilibrium in the sense of Banks and Sundaram (1990),
and the resulting supergame payoff does not equal the payoff of any stage game Nash
equilibria.
8For an alternative interpretation of Nash equilibrium using large (i.e., non-atomic),
but static, games see Barlo and Carmona (2002).
9A similar approach is taken in Carmona (2002a, Chapter 4), where monetary trading
is rationalized as a Pareto efficient way to obtain the same properties. See also Carmona
(2002b), in which the same result is established under weaker restrictions in a similar
model.
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conjecture that an analogue of Theorem 3 will hold, at least for a large class
of games.
A On the Reciprocal of Theorem 1
The following example shows that the condition in Theorem 1 is not sufficient.
Let n = 2 and Ai = {αi, βi}, i = 1, 2. Preferences are lexicographic for both
players. Let payoffs be given by
1\2 α2 β2
α1 0, 1 −1,−1
β1 0,−1 0, 1
Table 2: Payoff Function for Example 2
The following strategy is such that in every stage players play a Nash
equilibrium of the stage game, but which is not a semi-perfect equilibrium
of the supergame: S = {s0, s1}, T (s0, a) = s1, T (s1, a) = s0 for all a, and
B(s0) = (α1, α2), B(s
1) = (β1, β2). This strategy is clearly finitely complex,
symmetric, globally stable, and semi-perfect.
B Variations
In this appendix, we study whether our results are robust to alternative
definitions of stability and minimally complexity.
We can weaken the notion of global stability by requiring that the initial
state should not have an effect in the long-run payoff level, without requir-
ing that this payoff level be equal to the equilibrium level. The following
definition formalizes this idea.10
Definition 4 Let f ∈ Σ and let (u¯i)i∈N = (U i(f))i∈N . Then f is weakly
globally stable if for all i ∈ N , and s, s′ ∈ S,
lim
k→∞
U ik(f |s) = lim
k→∞
U ik(f |s′). (15)
10The definition of weak global stability was suggested to me by Narayana Kocherlakota.
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The notion of semi-perfection can also be weakened in a way suggested
by Abreu and Rubinstein (1988).
Definition 5 (Abreu and Rubinstein (1988)) A strategy vector f ∈ F
is a º −Nash equilibrium if for all i ∈ N , and gi ∈ Fi,
(U i(f), comp(fi)) ºi (U i(gi, f−i), comp(gi)). (16)
One can also define a subgame perfect equilibrium for any supergame in
which preferences depend on both payoffs and complexity.
Definition 6 A strategy vector f ∈ F is a º −subgame-perfect equilib-
rium if for all i ∈ N , s ∈ S1 × · · · × Sn and gi ∈ Fi,
(U i(f |s), comp(fi|s)) ºi (U i((gi, f−i)|(sg0i , s−i)), comp(gi)). (17)
The next result says that weak global stability is all we need for our
results.
Theorem 4 Theorems 1, 2, and 3 hold if we replace global stability with
weak global stability.
Proof. It is enough to show that Lemma 2 still holds. This is clear: if
we define u¯i = limk→∞ U ik(f |s), s ∈ S, then the same proof can be used.
However, our results are sensible to the notion of equilibrium used. If we
use º −Nash equilibrium, then all our results may fail, as an example below
shows. If we use º −subgame perfect equilibrium, then they all hold if we
restrict attention to cycle states. Since we can interpret cycle states as long-
run behavior, we can still associate social institutions with Nash equilibrium:
if players use enduring social institutions, them their long-run behavior will
be described by Nash equilibria.
For a given symmetric, and finitely complex strategy f let Sc(f) be the
set of cycle states. This set is defined as follows: a symmetric, finite au-
tomaton induces a sequence of states {sk}∞k=1, where s1 = s0, and sk =
T (sk−1, B(sk−1)) in a way that t2 = min{m ∈ N : sm+1 = sn for some n ≤
m} exists. Then Sc(f) = {st1 , . . . , st2}, where t1 ≤ t2 is such that st1 = st2+1.
Lemma 3 If f is a finitely complex, symmetric, and º −subgame perfect,
then T (s, a) belongs to Sc(f) for all s ∈ Sc(f), and a ∈ A.
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Proof. Let s ∈ Sc(f), and f be as above. We have that the set of states
that will be used after s is reached is Sc(f). Hence, similarly to Lemma 1,
we conclude that the state space of f |s is Sc(f). Otherwise any player would
remove any state outside of Sc(f), which would reduce the complexity of f |s
while maintaining the payoff. Thus, T (s, a) ∈ Sc(f).
Theorem 5 If a strategy f = ((S, s0), T, B) is a finitely complex, symmetric,
weakly globally stable, º −subgame perfect equilibrium then B(s) is a Nash
equilibrium of G, for all s ∈ Sc(f).
Proof. Assume that there exist s ∈ Sc(f) that is not a Nash equilibrium
of G. Let i ∈ N , and a∗i be such that ui(a∗i , B−i(s)) > ui(B(s)). Since
T (s, (a∗i , B−i(s))) ∈ Sc(f) by Lemma 3, and since, as one easily sees, the
conclusion of Lemma 2 still holds, we can use the proof of Theorem 1 to
show that f is not º −subgame perfect.
Let Ec(G) be the cycle payoff vectors supported by finitely complex, sym-
metric, weakly globally stable, º −subgame perfect equilibria. These payoff
vectors can be thought of the payoff players will obtain in the long-run (note
that these payoffs are well defined by an analogous version of Lemma 2.) As
a consequence of Theorem 5 we have
Theorem 6 Ec(G) = N(G).
Finally, in order to obtain an analog to Theorem 3, we define the following
notion of long-run Pareto optimality: an equilibrium f ∈ F is Pareto optimal
in the long run if it is not Pareto dominated in the long run by any other
equilibrium. An equilibrium f ∈ F Pareto dominates an equilibrium g in the
long run if for all s ∈ Sc(f),
(Ui(f |s), comp(fi|s) º (Ui(g|s), comp(gi|s), (18)
for all i ∈ N , and
(Uj(f |s), comp(fj|s) Â (Uj(g|s), comp(gj|s), (19)
for at least one j ∈ N . We then obtain
Theorem 7 A strategy f = ((S, s0), T, B) is a Pareto optimal, finitely com-
plex, symmetric, weakly globally stable, º − subgame perfect equilibrium if
and only if, comp(fi|s) = 1, for all i ∈ N , and B(s) is a Pareto optimal
Nash equilibrium of G, for all s ∈ Sc(f).
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The following example shows that the conclusions of Theorems 1, 2, and
3 may fail when semi-perfection is weakened to º −Nash. Let n = 2 and
Ai = {C,D,M}, i = 1, 2. Preferences are lexicographic for both players, and
players look first to the payoff. Let δ = 6/10, and stage game payoffs be
given by
1\2 C D M
C 6, 6 0, 7 0, 0
D 7, 0 1, 1 0, 0
M 0, 0 0, 0 3, 3
Table 3: Payoff Function for Example 3
Consider the following strategy f : the state space is S = {D,C}, and
s0 = D; the transition function is defined by
T (D, a) =
{
C if a = (D,D),
D otherwise,
(20)
and
T (C, a) =
{
C if a = (C,C),
D otherwise;
(21)
the behavior function is B(D) = (D,D), and B(C) = (C,C). This strategy
is obviously symmetric, globally stable, and has finite complexity. It is easy
to show that Ui(f) > Ui(gi, f−i) for all i ∈ N , and gi ∈ Σi. Hence, it follows
that f is a º −Nash equilibrium of the repeated game.
However, we have that B(C) = (C,C) is not a Nash equilibrium of the
stage game; hence the conclusion of Theorem 1 fails. The set of Nash equi-
libria payoffs in the stage game is N(G) = {(1, 1), (3, 3)}, but one sees that
U1(f) = U2(f) = 1 + 5δ > 3. Thus, the conclusion of Theorem 2 fails. Fi-
nally, the last inequality also shows that the strategy that consists of playing
the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium (M,M) of the stage game forever is not
Pareto optimal in the repeated game.
Also, we can use the above game to give an example to show that we can
not extend the conclusions of Theorems 5, 6, and 7 to all states. Consider
the following strategy f : the state space is S = {s0, s1, s2}; the transition
function is
T (s0, a) =
{
s1 if a = (C,C),
s2 otherwise,
(22)
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T (s1, a) = s2, and T (s2, a) = s2 for all a; the behavior function is B(s0) =
(C,C), B(s1) = (M,M), and B(s2) = (D,D). This strategy is obviously
symmetric, globally stable, and has finite complexity. It is easy to show that
Ui(f |sl) > Ui(gi, f−i|(s0gi , sl−i) for all i ∈ N , sl = s0, s1, s2, and gi ∈ Σi.
Hence, it follows that f is a º −subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated
game.
However, we have that B(s0) = (C,C) is not a Nash equilibrium of the
stage game; hence the conclusion of Theorem 1 fails. The set of Nash equi-
libria payoffs in the stage game is N(G) = {(1, 1), (3, 3)}, but one sees that
U1(f) = U2(f) = 6(1 − δ) + 3δ(1 − δ) + δ2 > 3. Thus, the conclusion of
Theorem 2 fails. Finally, the last inequality also shows that the strategy
that consists of playing the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium (M,M) of the
stage game forever is not Pareto optimal in the repeated game.
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